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1 Introduction
In the literature several explanations for the increasing wage inequality in the
U.S. as well as in continental Europe have been given. The most prominent
explanations are skill-biased-technological change (Autor and Katz (1999)),
job polarization (Goos et al. (2009)), mechanical changes in the workforce
composition (Lemieux (2006)), labor market institutions and episodic events
(Card and DiNardo (2002)). Recent empirical literature has pointed out
that much of the growth of wage inequality can however be ascribed to in-
creasing wage dispersion among workers with the same educational attain-
ment and/or experience (Violante (2002)). Put differently there seem to be
important mechanisms independent from standard observable factors, like
skills, influencing residual wage inequality. Recent empirical work suggest
that residual wage inequality is strongly linked to firm heterogeneity. Faggio
et al. (2010)) provide evidence that the between-firm inequality of labor pro-
ductivity has substantially increased over time and that the vast majority of
the increase in individual wage inequality in the UK is a between-firm (rather
than within-firm) phenomenon (see also Dunne et al. (2004)).
The goal of this paper is to explore the role of one such potential mech-
anism, namely referral hiring through social networks, on wage inequality.
The importance of referral hiring, which is workers finding jobs via the help
of social contacts is expressed by the claim of Montgomery (1991), that ”..it’s
not what you know but who you know”. This claim is supported by Bew-
ley (1999). He concludes in his survey of 24 studies that 30% to 60% of
jobs were found by using social contacts like friends and relatives. It is well
documented and widely accepted that social contacts help workers to find a
job.1 But the effect of finding jobs via social contacts on the wages is less
clear and is discussed controversially. Pellizzari (2010) analyzes a number of
European countries regarding their wage differentials between referred em-
ployees and non referred employees. He finds that wage premia and wage
penalties are equally frequent across countries for employees who found their
job via social contacts and attributes these differences to search strategies
of firms in the recruitment process. Among others Dustmann et al. (2010),
Schmutte (2010), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002), and Simon and Warner
(1992) find that referred employees receive higher wages. Lower wages for re-
ferred employees are documented in Bentolila et al. (2010), Antoninis (2006),
and Pistaferri (1999).
1An excellent survey over social networks and referrals can be found in Ioannides and
Loury (2004).
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We contribute to the discussion about wage inequality by analyzing the ef-
fects of the structure of social networks, especially their density, on wage
inequality via referrals. In this paper we ask (and try to answer) the ques-
tion: Does the density of the network influence the residual wage inequality
in different skill groups, and the across skill wage inequality? Given that
referral hiring seems to have become more frequent over the last years and
social networks seem to have become more dense2, answering this question
might contribute to a sound understanding of the mechanisms responsible
for the observed increase in wage inequality within (skill) groups.
In the present model workers have two dimensions of human capital en-
dowments. First they have an exogenously given general skill level, which can
be interpreted as formal qualification or general abilities. The general skills
are equally distributed across workers and are used to introduce homophily.
Workers with a certain general skill level are more likely to have friends with
the same general skill level. In addition to the general skills, workers have
an endogenously changing specific skill level, which can be interpreted as the
productivity or abilities attained on the job. These specific skills are ex-ante
not observable by firms. But they are revealed if an unemployed worker
is referred by an employed friend to his employer. The employee provides
the information about the specific skills of the friend to his employer. The
employer prefers referred over non referred applicants if the referred appli-
cants exceed a certain threshold of specific skills. Moreover, the employer
prefers applicants with high general skills over low skilled applicants. This
transmission of information in order to reduce uncertainty of firms about the
productivity of workers is also used in the models of Montgomery (1991) and
Dustmann et al. (2010). On the contrary, in the contributions by Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007) the role of social networks is that job
information is just passed around by workers.
Workers increase their specific skills on the job if they work with machines
with a quality such that the workers current skills are not sufficient to fully
exploit the potential productivity of the machine. The speed of learning of
a worker increases with his general skill level. There is a complementarity
between the productivity of the capital and the specific skills of workers. The
productivity of a worker-machine match is determined by the minimum of
the productivity of the machine and the specific skills of the worker.3 The
2For example a recent survey concerning firm recruiting activities shows that about 30%
of companies increase their investment in referral hiring and 55% invest more in recruit-
ing through social media (see http://recruiting.jobvite.com/resources/social-recruiting-
charts.php).
3Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) and Griffith et al. (2004) provide evidence that for
the adoption of a new technology adequate skills of the workforce are required.
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productivity of the firms’ capital stocks increases over time as firms acquire
newer vintages of machines. Firms determine their wage offers based on the
average specific skills of employees in each skill group. Each firm posts wage
offers for each general skill group, but the wage offers do not depend on
whether the employee is hired through a referral or not.
The simulations reported here show that in spite of the absence of explicit
wage discrimination of firms between referral and non-referral hirings the
average wage of workers who obtain their job through referrals is higher than
that for the other workers. The ratio of referral wages and non-referral wages
is positively correlated with the density of the network for all skill groups
but declines with the general skill level. These patterns influence the wage
inequality, which is measured via the standard deviation of overall wages,
skill dependent wages, and across skill groups. Furthermore, the standard
deviation of skill dependent wages is positively correlated with the network
density for low general skill levels. For high general skill groups, however,
the standard deviation of wages is not correlated with the network density.
Moreover, the standard deviation of wages between general skill levels is not
affected by the density of the social network.
The results of the simulation are based on a non-trivial mechanism. Due
to the observability of the specific skills of referred applicants, firms are
able to target among referred workers the best applicants with respect to
their specific skills. The applicants, however, accept job offers from firms
which are paying the highest wages. The firms paying the highest wages are
those which have the highest productivity which feed back to the specific
skills of their workforce. Hence, due to the increased transparency of the
labor market in the presence of more referrals, an endogeneously generated
clustering of workers with high specific skills at high productive firms emerges
and increases the wage inequality within groups of workers with identical
general skills. The effect mainly occurs for low general skill groups because
job turnover is higher for low skilled workers than for high skilled workers.
The reason for the differences in turnover is that low skilled workers are
dismissed more easily by firms.
Using the agent-based approach which endogenizes the evolution of the
productivity of workers, the determination of wage offers and wages as well as
the labor demand and considering the interplay of these factors distinguishes
the present contribution from analytical search models with a network struc-
ture developed in for example Dustmann et al. (2010), Schmutte (2010), or
Goel and Lang (2009).
Agent-based models have already been successfully used to shed light
on numerous economic questions. Tesfatsion and Judd (2006) provides an
overview of agent-based models applied in different areas of economic re-
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search. In the context of labor markets and social networks agent-based
models are presented for example in Gemkow and Neugart (2011), Tassier
and Menczer (2001), and Pingle and Tesfatsion (2003). Furthermore, Dawid
et al. (2008, 2009, 2011a), Dosi et al. (2010), and Delli Gatti et al. (2005) de-
veloped closed agent-based macroeconomic models where the contributions
by Dawid et al. rely on previous versions of the model used in this paper.
The innovative contribution of the present paper relative to all this work is
that it is the first study focusing on the distribution of wages emerging in
an agent-based macroeconomic model and considering the effects of social
networks on wage inequality in different skill groups.
In the next section 2 key features of the model and the network forma-
tion algorithm are described. The parametrization and simulation set-up are
explained in section 3. Afterwards in section 4 the simulation results and the
mechanism driving these results are presented. Finally a summary is given
in the last section 5.
2 The model - Eurace@Unibi
The analysis is conducted in a closed agent-based macroeconomic simulation
model. Previous versions of the model have already been used to analyze
policy measures fostering human capital endowments and the opening up of
labor markets (Dawid et al. (2008, 2009, 2011a)). The complexity and the
number of elaborate features of the framework is too high to present it in full
detail at this point. Instead a short overview is given and the most important
key features are described in order to make the results comprehensible and
understandable. The labor market is explained in more detail as the analysis
is focused on the role of referrals on wages. A more detailed documentation
and discussion of the model can be found in Dawid et al. (2011b).
2.1 Overview
The economy is populated by different types of agents. The main actors are
households, consumption good producers (firm) and one investment good
producer (igfirm). The central unit of time is a day. Five working days are
one week, four weeks are one month and twelve months are one year.
The agents make decisions following rules and the choice of the decision
rules in the Eurace@Unibi model is based on a systematic attempt to in-
corporate rules that resemble empirically observable behavior documented
in the relevant literature. Concerning households, this means that for ex-
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ample empirically identified saving rules are used and purchasing choices are
described using models from the Marketing literature with strong empirical
support. With respect to firm behavior we follow the ’Management Science
Approach’, which aims at implementing relatively simple decision rules that
match standard procedures of real world firms as described in the correspond-
ing management literature. A more extensive discussion of the Management
Science approach can be found in Dawid and Harting (2012). Decisions or
actions of agents can be event driven or time driven. Time driven decisions
are made on a daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly base depending on the agent
type and the context of the decision. The real side of the economy, i.e.
the consumption goods market, the investment goods market, and the labor
market are modeled in much detail with elaborate decision rules and agent
interactions. The model also incorporates a rudimentary financial and credit
market in order to close the model.
As usual households have a dual role as consumers and workers. A worker
w has two dimensions of human capital endowments namely an exogenously
given general skill level bgenw and an endogenously increasing specific skill
level bw,t. General skills can be interpreted as formal qualification or general
embodied abilities while specific skills are experiences or abilities obtained on-
the-job reflecting the productivity of each worker. There exist five general
skill levels4, described by different values of bgen, i.e. bgen ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
bgen = 1 is the lowest general skill level and bgen = 5 the highest. General
skill levels determine how fast workers can acquire specific skills by on the
job learning. General skills are observable by firms in the hiring process,
while specific skills are not. They become observable to employers during
the production process.
2.2 Consumption goods market
Consumption goods are produced by the firms once in a month on their acti-
vation day. The activation days of firms are asynchronously distributed over
the month. The consumption goods are homogenous regarding quality, but
horizontally differentiated and heterogeneous in prices. Each firm conducts
a detailed production planning containing the calculation of the vertically
differentiated input factors capital and labor. Planned production quanti-
ties and prices are determined by using estimated residual demand curves
obtained from simulated purchase surveys on a test market. Each firm sends
a query to a representative sample of households containing different prices
4Although the choice of five general skill levels has been inspired by the five levels used
in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) the general skill groups used in the
model should not be seen as a representation of the five IALS levels.
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for its good once in a year. Households answer this query by sending their
purchasing decision for each queried price. These answers are based on the
same decision rules households employ in their actual purchasing decisions.
Based on the answers and the development of the economy firms form de-
mand expectations and conduct a detailed cost and profit analysis. They
set planned productions quantities and prices in order to maximize the ex-
pected discounted profits over their planing horizon taking into account the
estimated marginal costs and the elasticity of demand. Firms store the pro-
duced goods in a mall. Each household visits the mall once a week but not
all households on the same day of the week. They spend their consump-
tion budget in order to purchase consumption goods. Since the consumption
goods are homogenous regarding the quality but heterogeneous in prices less
expensive goods are more likely to be chosen. The decision which good to
buy is described using a logit-choice model with strong empirical foundation
in the Marketing literature (see e.g. Malhotra (1984)). In several parts of
the the Eurace@Unibi model choices of decision makers are described by logit
models. These models are well suited to capture decisions where individuals
try to maximize some objective function which depends on observable and
unobservable variables.
The production technology of firm i is represented by a linear-limitational
production function. This Leontief production function implies a fixed pro-
portion of the input factors capital and labor. It is assumed that one unit
of capital is used by one worker. Furthermore, it is assumed that employees
with the highest general skills use the most productive machines in order to
exploit the productivity of the machines as much as possible. Thus, machines
and workers are deployed in descending order regarding their productivity.
The effective productivity of the capital-worker combination is the mini-
mum of the productivity of the capital and the specific skills of the worker
min[Av, bw,t], where A
v is the quality of the used vintage v and bw,t the spe-
cific skills of worker w in period t. Since the size of the capital stock for a
vintage might not necessarily be an integer, it might happen that a worker
cannot spend his full working time on the same vintage. In that case the
remaining fraction of the working time of this worker is allocated to next
lower vintage.
As mentioned above, workers embody an exogenously given general skill
level and an endogenously changing level of specific skills. The specific skills
are increasing over time during the production process. Workers are learning
on-the-job when using the currently employed machines (see e.g. Argote and
Epple (1990)). It is assumed that workers with higher general skills bgenw learn
faster than workers with lower general skills. The condition for the learning
of workers is that the productivity of the machine used by a worker w is
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higher than his specific skills Av > bw,t. In the opposite case the specific
skills of the worker remain unchanged. Formally the updating of specific
skills of a worker w employed by firm i can be written as
bw,t = bw,t−1 +
∑
v∈V :svw,t>0
svw,i,t · χ(bgenw ) ·max[0, Av − bw,t],
where svw,i,t denotes the fraction of time the worker spends with machine of
vintage v in period t. The function χ(bgen) increases with general skills bgenw
and 0 < χ(bgenw ) < 1.
2.3 Investment goods market:
Investment goods5 are produced by one investment goods producer. The
investment goods producer offers different vintages of the investment good
with different qualities on every day. The supply of each vintage is infinite.
In order to simplify the model at this point it is assumed that the invest-
ment goods producer is able to produce without any input factors and any
costs. The introduction time of new vintages with improved quality follows
an exogenous stochastic process, where the quality of a machine determines
the maximal productivity that can be reached with the machine in case it is
used by workers with sufficiently high specific skills. The investment goods
producer expands the set of offered vintages as soon as a new vintage be-
comes available. Prices for the vintages are determined by the investment
goods producer using a combination of a cost based approach and a value
based approach. In order to close the model the revenues of the investment
goods producer are paid out as dividends to the households. Consumption
goods producers use the investment goods as an input factor in their pro-
duction. They have to choose between the offered vintages if they want to
expand their capital stock or to replace the depreciated fraction. In order to
make a vintage choice decision firms estimate the costs and expected future
benefits of the different vintages, which depend on the distribution of skills
in their workforce. A consumption good producer has to choose between the
different vintages v ∈ {1, ..., Vt} offered at different productivities Av and
different prices pv by the investment goods producer where Vt denotes the
index of the most recent vintage at time t. The benefit of an offered vintage
is the additional output it generates. The costs are the price pv. In order
to determine the benefit of a vintage v firm i takes into consideration the
complementarity between the productivity of the vintage Av and the average
specific skills of its workforce Bi,t. The effective productivity of a vintage
5Investment goods can also be denoted as machines or capital.
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v is estimated by min[Av, Bi,t]. If A
v > Bi,t firm i cannot fully exploit the
technology of the vintage since it is constraint by the specific skills of the
workforce. Since the specific skills of the workforce are generally increasing
over time firm i estimates the development of the specific skills for the next
S months. The potential effective productivity of a vintage v is then given
by min[Av, B˜i,t+s] for each month s ≤ S, where B˜i,t+s denotes the expected
future specific skills of the firm’s workforce. The sum over the discounted
potential effective productivities
Bv =
S∑
s=0
(
1
1 + ρ
)s
min[Av, B˜i,t+s]
with discount rate ρ > 0 is used as a proxy for the benefit of vintage v.
The probability Probvi,t for choosing vintage v is determined by a logit
model using the ratio of the benefit and the costs of a vintage rv = B
v
pv
and
a parameter γV int for the sensivity of choice
Probvi,t =
exp(γV int · rv)∑V
v=1 exp(γ
V int · rv) .
The higher γV int the higher is the probability to choose the vintage with the
highest value of rv.
2.4 Labor market and referral hiring
Labor supply
Unemployed workers are searching for jobs. An unemployed worker searches
actively on average on two randomly chosen days in a month. He takes the
wage offers of a randomly chosen set of firms posting vacancies into con-
sideration and compares them with his reservation wage. In case that his
reservation wage is lower than the wage offer he sends one application to the
corresponding firm containing his general skill level. The maximum number
of overall non referral applications per month is exogenously given. On the
remaining days of the month he is not actively searching. But he might re-
ceive one or more referrals from his employed friends for one or more firms.
In that case he sends one application to each referred firm indicating that
he received a referral, if the wage offer is higher than his reservation wage.
In that sense a referral from a friend activates an otherwise non active un-
employed on that day. It is also possible that he receives referrals on days
when he is actively searching. In that case he sends (referral) applications
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to referred firms and applications to non-referred firms.
Labor demand
The labor demand is determined by consumption good firms in their pro-
duction planning. In case of an expansion of the production quantity firm i
posts vacancies containing wage offers woi,t,g for each general skill level g in
period (month) t on its activation day. The wage offer has two constituent
parts. The first part is the market driven base wage wbasei,t . The base wage is
paid per unit of specific skill. If the firm cannot fill its vacancies it increases
the base wage to attract more workers. The second part is related to the
expected productivity of a worker. Firms build this expectation based on
the average specific skills in each general skill group inside the firm b¯i,t,g. For
each of the general skill groups the firm i offers different wages. The wage
offer of firm i for an applicant with general skill g is given by
wOi,t,g = bi,t,g · wbasei,t
In addition, the firms inform their current employees about the vacancies and
the corresponding wage offers. The employees can pass this information to
their unemployed friends by making a referral. It is assumed that the specific
skills of a referred applicant can be observed by the firm due to information
the firm receives from the employee referring the worker. In that sense a re-
ferral has to be distinguished from purely passing the job information. Firms
consider a referral only if the revealed specific skills of the applicant are higher
than the economy wide average specific skill of level workers with this general
skill. Hence, firms are using the referral hiring in order to get highly produc-
tive workers. An employee makes only one referral per month and only if the
specific skills of his unemployed friend exceeds this specific skill requirement.6
If the employee has more than one unemployed friend fulfilling the specific
skill requirement he chooses randomly among those friends. Since the wage
offer is the same for referred and non-referred applicants firms expect that
on average the ratio between the wage offer and the specific skill is lower in
the case of a referred applicant. Put differently, on average they get higher
specific skills for the same costs. Hence, in the hiring process firms prefer
referred applicants over non referred applicants. Inside both groups they also
prefer applicants with higher general skills over applicants with lower general
skills because high general skill workers will improve their specific skills faster.
6Beside the fact that in this model firms try to get employees with high specific skills via
the referrals, Saloner (1985) argued that employees tend to refer more productive workers.
Referring a low productive friend could be disreputable.
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Preferring referred over non referred applicants due to the reduction of un-
certainty is in line with Montgomery (1991). If the firms plan to decrease the
workforce employees with low general skills are dismissed first, because they
have generally a lower speed of learning. At the end of each month wages of
employees are increased by the monthly productivity growth rate. This can
be interpreted as a reduced form representation of collective wage bargaining.
Matching algorithm
Consumption good firms decide once a month on their activation day whether
to post vacancies or not. The matching between job seekers and vacancies
works in the following way:
Step 1:
Firms post vacancies including wage offers and inform their workforce about
the vacancies and wage offers. Each employee refers one unemployed friend
if he has an unemployed friend whose specific skills exceed the economy wide
average specific skills in his general skill group. If the employee does not
have such a friend he does not give a referral and if he has more than one
such friend he chooses randomly.
Step 2:
Each job seeker checks the posted vacancies on average on two days in a
month. Furthermore, he might receive referrals which activate him on days
when he is not searching. From the list of vacancies and/or referrals he ex-
tracts those postings which fit in terms of his reservation wage. He sends
applications to randomly chosen non referred firms and (referral) applica-
tions to referred firms.
Step 3:
If the number of applicants is smaller or equal to the number of vacancies the
firms send job offers to every applicant. If the number of applicants is higher
than the number of vacancies firms send job offers to as many applicants as
they have vacancies to fill. Firms prefer referred applicants over non referred
applicants when sending job offers. Inside both groups they prefer applicants
with higher general skills over applicants with lower general skills.
Step 4:
11
Each unemployed ranks the incoming job offers according to the offered
wages. The ranking depends solely on the offered wages and not on re-
ferrals. The highest ranked job offer is accepted by each unemployed. The
other job offers are ignored.
Step 5:
Firms adjust their vacancy list for filled jobs and their labor force for new
employees.
Step 6:
If an unemployed k did not find a job he reduces his reservation wage by
an exogenously given fraction φ ∈ [0, 1], that is wRk,t+1 = (1 − φ)wRk,t. The
lower bound for the reservation wage are the unemployment benefits that k
receives from the government. If an unemployed k found a job his new reser-
vation wage is set to his actual wage, wRk,t = wk,i,t. If the number of unfilled
vacancies exceeds a threshold value V the firm increases the base wage offer
by an exogenously given fraction υ ∈ [0, 1], that is wbasei,t+1 = (1 + υ)wbasei,t) . Go
to step 1.
This algorithm runs on each day and is aborted after two iterations. Re-
ferrals are only made in the first iteration as well as the update of the base
wage offer. It happens that not all firms can fill their vacancies and not all
unemployed find a job. This leads to labor market frictions and rationing of
firms regarding their labor demand.
3 Parametrization and set-up of experiment
Table 1 summarizes the general setup in terms of numbers and types of the
most important agents in the framework. The intention of the analysis to get
a qualitative understanding of the role of referrals on wage inequality in the
presence of changing number of friends and homophily. Hence, no attempt
has been made to match the skill distribution with empirical data from a
particular economy, but the general skill levels are assumed to be distributed
equally across the households. Each of the five general skill groups contains
320 households. The idea is to avoid effects which are the result of different
general skill group sizes. Table 2 presents the initialization values of the key
variables. The technological frontier AV0 is the productivity of the latest
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Table 1: General set up
Description Value
Households 1600
Consumption goods producers 80
Investment good producers 1
Table 2: Initialization
Description Value
Technological Frontier: AV0 1.7
Capital Stock: Ki,0 19.0
Productivity Capital Stock: Ai,0 1.5
Specific Skill Level: bw,0 1.5
Initial Base Wage Offer: wbasei,0 1
vintage type offered by the investment goods producer in t = 0. The techno-
logical progress is driven by an exogenous stochastic process and is on average
2% per year. The initial capital stock of each firm Ki,0 is 19.0 and consists
of one vintage type. Taken into account the one to one correspondence of
workers and machines each firm wants to hire 19 workers at the beginning.
Having 80 firms and 1600 households this would lead to an unemployment
rate of 5%. The productivity of the initial capital stock is Av0 = 1.5, where
it is assumed that initially all firms use a vintage v0 < V0 whose productivity
is slightly below the technological frontier. The same holds for the specific
skills bw,t of workers. Consequently, at the beginning workers are not able
to learn since there is no gap between the technology and the specific skills.
But if the first firms decide to increase their capital stock or to replace the
depreciated capital stock with machines having a higher productivity, i.e.
machines of the latest vintage types, a gap between technology and specific
skills for some workers is generated. At that point the learning regarding the
specific skills starts to take place. All households are starting with the same
specific skill level 1.5 and hence, the initial wage offers woi,t,g and therefore the
wages are also 1.5. Taken together the points mentioned above it should be
highlighted that wage and specific skill distributions emerge endogenously as
a result of the dynamic interplay of production decisions of firms and labor
market interactions. We do not present the full calibration of the model.
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The full set of used parameter values is motivated by empirical observations
and chosen such hat a set of empirical stylized facts on different levels of
aggregation are reproduced by the model Dawid et al. (2011b).
In the analysis four types of social networks are compared. These dif-
ferent networks were generated by a stochastic algorithm, which allows to
produce networks with given degree distribution and inbreeding homophily
index7 (see Gemkow (2011) for details). The networks considered in the fol-
lowing analysis differ with respect to their degree distribution and therefore
with respect to the average number of friends and the density. The degree
distribution of all four networks follows a power-law distribution, where the
probability for a household to have k links is given by
pk = Ck
−α.
The constant C normalizes the degree distribtion such that
∑kmax
kmin
pk = 1.
According to Newman (2010) the exponent α of the power-law distribution
lies in the range of 2 ≤ α ≤ 3 and is set to 2.5 for all four networks. Empirical
evidence suggests that in many social networks there exists a kmin such that
the power-law properties hold for k ≥ kmin, whereas for k < kmin we have
pk < pkmin
8. To keep things simple it is assumed here that pk = 0 for
k < kmin, which means that kmin is the lower bound of links per household.
The upper bound for the number of links per household is given by kmax. The
technical maximum number of links per household is given by the number
of total household (1600), but it does not seems reasonable to assume that
one household might know all other households. In the baseline network 1
the lower and the upper limits are set to kmin = 1 and kmax = 20. The four
different networks are generated by multiplying both limits with a parameter
M with M ∈ [1, 2, 4, 8] and are calibrated in such a way that the inbreeding
homophily index IH is always ≈ 0.48. This value lies within the range
identified for empirical data in Currarini et al. (2009). Table 3 summarizes
the four different networks. For each simulation for the four considered cases
a stochastically generated network with the given properties was generated.
7The inbreeding homophily index IHg for one general skill group g used by Currarini
et al. (2009) is given by IHg =
Hg−ng
1−ng where ng is the fraction of household with general
skill g and Hg =
sg
sg+dg
is the homophily index which measures the the fraction of links
to households with the same general skill level. sg (dg) denotes the number of links to
households with the same (different) general skill level. The imbreeding homophily index
is than given by IH =
∑5
g=1 ng · IHg.
8See Newman (2010) for a summary of the characteristics of different social networks
such as actor, telephone call, email, or sexual contact networks and for further references.
Lewis et al. (2008) show the power-law behavior of the degree distribution for Facebook
data.
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Table 3: Networks
Properties / Networks 1 2 3 4
kmin 1 2 3 4
kmax 20 40 80 160
α 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Average number of links ≈ 2 ≈ 4 ≈ 9 ≈ 18
The networks always stay constant over time. For each of the five considered
networks 40 batch-runs over 10000 periods (days, 500 months, 42 years)
were conducted. The qualitative statements made in the following section
are backed up by statistical significance test w.r.t. this data. The results
in the next section are mainly displayed using box plots that represent the
distribution across the 20 batch-runs for each network. Each of the 40 data
points per box plot represents the average of the last 20 monthly observations
of a single run.
4 Results and Mechanism
The main research question addressed in this paper is whether the increase
in density of social networks and the increase in referral hiring are a potential
mechanism responsible for the observable increase of wage inequality within
groups with the same educational attainment and/or experience. In order to
address this issue we compare the within group wage inequality as well as the
between group inequality for different densities of the social network. Within
group wage inequality is measured by the standard deviation of wages of em-
ployed individuals within a certain general skill group divided by the average
wage of workers in this group. To measure the between group inequality we
calculate the average wage in each skill group and determine the standard
deviation of these values normalized by the average wage in the population.
The discussion of our results is organized in a way that we first state the
main insights concerning the effects of network density on wage inequality in
terms of three observations. Afterwards we highlight and discuss the mech-
anisms driving these observations. It should be pointed out that the aim of
the analysis is to gain a qualitative understanding of the mechanism driving
the results. Therefore, the focus lies rather on identifying correlations and
patterns in the variables of interest when varying the network density rather
than on quantitative statements and comparisons of the size of different ef-
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fects that are identified. Having discussed the effect of increased network
density on wage inequality we then briefly explain the effect on the wage
level of such a change in the social network.
Figure 1 shows the within group wage inequality for all five skill groups
for increasing network density. It can be easily seen that the standard de-
viation of wages is positively correlated with the network density. But the
correlation decreases with higher general skills. For general skill groups 3 and
4 no systematic effect of an increase in network density on the wage inequal-
ity can be seen while for skill group 5 the correlation is slightly negative.9
These points are summarized in our first main observation.
Observation 1: Increasing the density of the social network significantly
increases the within group wage inequality for the low general skill groups.
Figure 2 presents for each of the four social networks in panels (a)-(d)
the dynamics of the standard deviation of wages for skill groups 1-5. It be-
comes obvious that in addition to observation 1 the standard deviation of
wages decreases with the general skill level for a given density. Concern-
ing the dynamics of the standard deviation of wages, we oberve an almost
stationary pattern.
The overall wage inequality in the population results from the combina-
tion of within group and across group variation (as well as from composition
effects if the fractions of employees from the different skill groups change). As
mentioned in the introduction factors like skill biased technological change
have been identified as main drivers of the increasing wage inequality between
skill groups. The focus here is on within group inequality, but it is neverthe-
less important to understand whether an increase in the density of the social
network also has implication on between group inequality. As can be seen
from Figure 3 the density has no systematic effect in this respect. Obviously
a key assumption here is that the expected number of links is independent
from the general skill level of the worker. Exploring the effects of hetero-
geneity between skill groups in this respect would certainly be interesting
and empirically relevant but is beyond the scope of the present analysis. The
following observation highlights that an increase in network density should
indeed be mainly seen as a trigger for an increase of within group rather than
between group wage inequality.
Observation 2: Increasing the density of the social network does not in-
9We applied Wilcoxon rank tests to confirm the statistical significance of our different
observations. The results are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1: Standard deviation of wages per general skill level.
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(c) SD Wage Network 3
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(d) SD Wage Network 4
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Figure 2: Standard deviation of wages for skill groups 1-5 per network. Skill
1 solid, skill 2 dashed, skill 3 dotted, skill 4 dashed-dotted, skill 5 long-dashed
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Figure 3: Standard Deviation of Wages between Skill Levels
crease the between group wage inequality.
We now return to the wage inequality within a skill group. In the presence
of job referrals the wages earned by members of this group can be separated
into two classes: the wages earned by workers who got their job through
referrals and those who went through the regular labor market. It should be
noted that an assumption of our model is that each firm pays identical wages
to all its incoming employees with a certain general skill level no matter
whether the employee was hired through a referral or not. This might sug-
gest that there should be no systematic difference between the two classes of
wages mentioned above. However, as can be clearly seen from panels (a) and
(b) of Figure 4, wages of workers who obtained their jobs through referrals
are significantly higher than those of the other workers.10 The mechanism
responsible for this fact will be discussed below. An implication of this ob-
servation is that the wage inequality within a skill group can be decomposed
into the inequality within referral wages, the inequality within non-referral
wages and the gap between referral and non-referral wages. The lower panels
of Figure 4 indicate that not only the gap between referral and non-referral
10For reasons of clarity and simplicity we depict in this and all the following figures only
the highest and the lowest skill group. The qualitative patterns for the three intermediate
skill groups are fully in accordance with the ones shown in the figures.
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wages increases as the density of the social network goes up, but that for
low skill groups also the inequality within the group of referral wages goes
up significantly. Although for the highest skill group we also observe an in-
crease of the referral/non-referral wage ratio and of the standard deviation of
referral wages if the network density goes up, the size of both effects is much
weaker than for the low skill group. For the group of non-referral wages (cor-
responding figure is not shown here) no positive effect of increased network
density on wage inequality can be observed. Summarizing, we get:
Observation 3: Increasing the density of the social network increases for
each skill group the wage gap between workers who obtained jobs with respec-
tively without referrals. Furthermore, it increases for low skill groups the
wage inequality within the group of workers who obtained their job by refer-
rals.
Observations 1 and 3 indicate that an increase in network density in-
creases wage inequality within the skill groups because of an increases in
the gap between referral and non-referral wages and an increase in inequality
within referral wages. Furthermore, the effect is more pronounced for low
skill groups.
We now turn to the exploration of the mechanisms responsible for these
observations. The kind of influence an increased network density has on the
wages of workers with low general skills is far from obvious. Since there
is no wage discrimination between referred ond non referred workers with
identical general skills within a firm the increased wage inequality must result
from the wage dispersion between firms and a sorting effect resulting in the
systematic overrepresentation of workers hired through referrals in firms that
pay relatively high wages. The firms paying above average wages are those
with above average productivity. Since firm productivity depends on the
quality of the firm’s capital stock as well as the level of specific skills of its
employees we depict in Figure 5 the correlation between the specific skills
in a firm per skill group and its fraction of referral hirings as well as the
correlation between the quality of the capital stock of a firm and its fraction
of referral hirings. Both correlations are significantly positive indicating that
indeed firms with a high productivity for a certain skill group have a larger
fraction of employees of that group hired through referrals. These firms are
able to attract the workers with the largest specific skills, which explains
the observed gap between referral and non-referral wages. The correlation
is much stronger for the specific skills in a firm, which is due to the fact
that in most cases the skills of workers are the limiting factor rather than
the quality of the employed machine which means that actual productivity is
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Figure 4: Ratio between referral and non-referral wages for general skill levels
1 (a) and 5 (b). Standard deviation of referral wages for general skill groups
1 (c) and 5 (d)
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mainly determined by specific skills in a firm. The mechanism responsible for
this observation is quite clear. When hiring through referrals firms are able
to observe the specific skills of workers, which means that they can target
the workers with above average specific skills. All firms try to do this, but
the most productive firms are most attractive for workers since they offer the
highest wages. Therefore, the most advanced firms have a larger probability
of filling their vacancies with above average workers using referrals and this
process reinforces the relative productivity advantage of these firms.
Due to the complementarity between specific skills and the quality of
the capital stock, also the relative technological advantage of these firms is
reinforced, but this effect seems to be relatively small. An increase of the
frequency of referral hirings due to an increased network density therefore
should lead to an increase in the heterogeneity of firms with respect to the
specific skills of their workers. Figure 6 shows the standard deviation of
average specific skills of the workforce across firms and confirms this con-
clusion for the considered low general skill group. For workers with general
skill 5 no such systematic effect on the standard deviation of specific skills
arises. On the one hand this is due to the much lower frequency of job
turnovers of workers of this skill group, which stems from the fact that firms
are more reluctant to dismiss workers with high general skills in case they
reduce their work force. Hence, the described clustering of high general skill
workers at certain firms can only occur much slower as can be seen in Figure
7. Figure 7 presents the Herfindahl Index of employees for skill levels 1 and
511. The Herfindahl Index is used to measure the concentration of employees
with a cetain general skill level across firms. If workers in all general skill
groups were equally distributed across firms the Herfindahl indices would
read 1/80 = 0.0125. Hence, Figure 7 shows that workers of all skill groups
are concentrated within the set of firms and the concentration is significantly
higher for low general skill groups. Furthermore, the Herfindahl index is
positively correlated with the network density for all skill groups. On the
other hand, the effect of allocation patterns of workers to firms on the specific
skill dynamics is much lower for workers in the highest skills groups. These
workers are always exposed to the highest vintages available in the firms,
which vary relatively little across firms. For low skill groups the vintage they
can work with depends crucially on the distribution of general skill groups
within the workforce of the firm and firms vary substantially in this respect.
Figure 8 shows that firms workforce compositions tend to concentrate only
11The Herfindahl Index for a given general skill group in period t is defined as HHg =∑F
i=1 x
2
i,t,g, where F denotes the number of consumption good producers and xi,t,g the
fraction of employees with general skills g working in firm i.
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the productivity of the used capital stock in firms and the fraction of referred
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation of specific skills between firms for general skill
levels 1 (a) and 5 (b)
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Figure 8: Deviation of firms workforce composition from the economy wide
composition of genral skill of employed households.
on a few general skill groups and deviate from the composition of the econ-
omy wide workforce.12 Putting this together with Figure 7 implies that the
gap in terms of on the job learning between firms is much more pronounced
for workers in low skill groups because low skill workers get access to more
productive machines in firms where the workforce in concentrated in low skill
levels.
Given the higher dismissal rate and the larger heterogeneity of specific
skills there is a relatively large fraction of low skilled unemployed with rela-
tively high specific skills and therefore a high reservation wage. These unem-
ployed refuse referrals from friends working in firms with a low concentration
of low skilled employees and consequently low wage offers. They wait until
they find a firm which is paying a high wage for their low skill group, which
means that this firm has a high fraction of (referred) employees in that low
12If workers would be matched to firms randomly the composition of the workforce of
firms regarding the general skills should be nearly equal to the economy wide composition
of general skills of employed households. The following measure, which is used in Figure
8 would be 0 if the workforce compostion of all firms would be equal to the economy wide
compostion.
Concentrationt =
1
F
·
F∑
i=1
G∑
g=1
(ri,t,g − rt,g)2 (1)
where F is the number of firms and G is the number of general skill levels. rt,g = et,g/et
is the fraction of all employees et,g with general skill level g of all employees et in the
economy. The same ratios are calculated for the employees ei,t,g in each firm i that is
ri,t,g = ei,t,g/ei,t.
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Figure 9: Fraction of refused referrals: comparisons of skill levels 1-5 for
Network 1 (a) und 4 (b)
skill group thereby reinforcing the concentration pattern explained above.
Figure 9 displays that in network 1 panel (a) and 4 (b) low skilled workers
refuse a higher percentage of referrals than high skilled workers.
From the perspective of the workers the described mechanism induces
a path dependency in the sense that workers who happen to acquire high
specific skills early on have higher chances to be hired by technologically
more advanced firms, which due to the learning by doing effects reinforces
their relative specific skill advantage with respect to their peers. This effect
becomes stronger the more transparent the market becomes in a sense that
specific skills of workers are observable for potential employees. Hence, in-
creasing the density of the social network leads to the emergence of larger
heterogeneity among workers of identical general skills with respect to their
specific skills and hence to larger wage inequality also within the group of
referral wages, as stated in Observation 3.
Having explored in some detail the mechanisms responsible for Observa-
tions 1 and 3 we now briefly deal with the effect of an increase of network
density on the wage level. Figure 10 clearly shows that the wage level of all
skill groups decreases if the expected number of links per worker goes up. To
understand this effect, it has to be realized that wages for a certain general
skill group in a given firm are determined as the product of the base wage
offer of that firm and the estimated average productivity, as measured by the
average specific skills of workers with that general skills in the firm. The base
wage offer captures the tightness of the labor market as firms increase their
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Figure 10: Wage for general skill levels 1 (a) and 5 (b)
base wage offer whenever their fraction of vacancies they are unable to fill
exceeds a certain level. Changes in the wage level therefore might result from
changes in the labor market tightness as well as from changes in the aver-
age specific skills of workers. Considering these two components of the wage
separately clearly shows that the decrease in wages is due to a decrease in
the base wage offer of firms rather than to systematic changes in the workers
specific skills (corresponding boxplots are not reported here). Indeed Figure
11, showing the average fraction of unfilled vacancies of all firms, clearly indi-
cates that an increase in the density of the social network leads to a decrease
in the labor market friction and hence to reduced tightness on the labor mar-
ket. Accordingly, firms increase their base wage offers with lower frequency
and wage levels go down. The observation that a more dense social network
leads to a higher number of successful employer-employee matches and hence
to lower labor market frictions is quite intuitive. Increasing the number of
links per employee makes it more likely that an employed worker knows a
suitable searching worker if an opening in that firm appears. Therefore, the
number of referrals goes up and, since these referrals generate potential em-
ployer employee matches in addition to the regular labor market interactions,
the probability that the vacancy can be filled increases.
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Figure 11: Fraction of unfilled vacancies
Observation 4: Increasing the density of the social network decreases the
wage level for all skill groups. This effect is due to decreased labor market
frictions inducing lower incentives of firms to increase base wage offers.
The decreased market frictions associated with higher network densities
do not only influence the wage level, but also affects the heterogeneity of
base wage offers in a firm. Reduced frictions imply that firms increase the
base wage offers for incoming employees less frequently, which means that
the heterogeneity of base wages paid to different employees, who entered the
firm at different points in time, goes down. This induced reduction in het-
erogeneity of base wages within each firm negatively affects the overall wage
inequality and also the residual wage inequality for each skill groups. For the
low skill groups this effect is clearly dominated by the mechanisms described
above, which lead to an increase in heterogeneity of specific skills of workers
and of the productivity-related wage component across firms. For the highest
general skill group 5, where these mechansims have only a very minor effect,
as discussed above, the induced reduction in base wage heterogeneity domi-
nates and this leads to the negative dependence on residual wage inequality
on network density for skill group 5, as observed in Figure 1 (e).
5 Conclusions
The starting point of this paper are two empirical observations. First, resid-
ual wage inequality within groups of workers with the same educational at-
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tainment and/or experience has gone up in recent years. Second, the involve-
ment of households in social networks as well as the hiring of firms through
social networks is increasing. Using an agent-based closed macroeconomic
model we have shown that these two observations might be connected. We
have highlighted a mechanism indicating how the increase in the density
of the social network can contribute to increasing residual wage inequality
even in the absence of any explicit wage discrimination of employers between
referral and non-referral hirings. The main message is that the increased
transparency on the labor market, implied by a more intensive use of refer-
rals, induces a stronger clustering of workers with high specific skills (and
therefore high productivity) at the most productive firms. This leads to an
increased heterogeneity of firms with respect to productivity and of workers
with respect to specific skills implying the increased wage inequality. Fur-
thermore, the increased transparency reduces labor market frictions, thereby
reducing the fraction of unfilled vacancies and the wage level. Clearly, other
factors might also contribute to the observed increase in residual wage in-
equality, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify which fraction
of the observed effect is due to the mechanisms described here. Considering
this issue might be the starting point of future empirical work.
Since the mechanism identified in this paper relies on the interplay of the
evolution of productivity of firms, the skills of workers and of the match-
ing between firms and workers, a model capturing the heterogeneity of firms
and workers as well as linking the dynamics of goods and labor markets is
necessary to identify this pattern. This study therefore demonstrates that
agent-based models, which combine these features, are useful tools to study
issues of (income) inequality and to explore mechanisms contributing to the
emergence of inequality. So far agent-based models have hardly been em-
ployed in this respect and it seems that the potential of these models in the
area of inequality research could be exploited much more intensively.
Although the model incorporates elaborate features regarding the social
network and the referral hiring there are several important possible exten-
sions. One could allow for systematic heterogeneity of workers with respect
to the number of their links and study in how far a systematic relationship
between the heterogeneity of workers with respect to the number of links
and wage inequality emerges. Furthermore, the mechanism identified here
suggest that increasing the homophily in the social network should further
contribute to the emergence of wage inequality. A systematic exploration of
this issue should deepen our understanding of the relationship between the
structure of social networks and the wage distribution. Finally, it should be
examined in how far the mechanism described here is affected by the speed
of technological change captured in the model by the speed of movement of
29
the technological frontier (i.e. the productivity of the most recent capital
vintage). All this is left for future research.
References
Antoninis, M. (2006): “The Wage Effect from the Use of Personal Contacts
as Hiring Channels,” Journal of Economic Behaviour of Organization, 59,
133–146.
Argote, L. and D. Epple (1990): “Learning Curves in Manufacturing,”
Science, 247, 920–924.
Autor, D. and L. Katz (1999): “Changes in the Wage Structure and
Earnings Inequality,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashen-
felter and D. Card, Amsterdam: Elsevier, vol. 3A, 1463–1555.
Bassanini, A. and S. Scarpetta (2002): “Does Human capital Mat-
ter for Growth in OECD countries?: A Pooled Mean Group Approach,”
Economics Letters, 74, 399–405.
Bentolila, S., C. Michellaci, and J. Suarez (2010): “Social Contacts
and Occupational Choice,” Economica, 77.
Bewley, T. (1999): Why wage don’t fall during a recession, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Calvo-Armengol, A. and M. Jackson (2004): “The effects of social
networks on employment and inequality,” American Economic Review, 94,
426–454.
——— (2007): “Networks in labor markets: wage and employment dynamics
and inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 27–46.
Card, D. and J. DiNardo (2002): “Skill-Biased Technological Change
and RisingWage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles,” Journal of La-
bor Economics, 20, 733–783.
Currarini, S., M. O. Jackson, and P. Pin (2009): “An Economic
Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation,” Econo-
metrica, 77, 1003–1045.
30
Dawid, H., S. Gemkow, P. Harting, and M. Neugart (2009): “On
the effects of skill upgrading in the presence of spatial labor market fric-
tions: an agent-based analysis of spatial policy design,” Journal of Artifical
Societies and Social Simulation – JASSS, 12.
——— (2011a): “Labor market integration policies and the convergence of
regions: the role of skills and technology diffusion,” Journal of Evolution-
ary Economics, forthcoming.
Dawid, H., S. Gemkow, P. Harting, M. Neugart, and K. Wer-
sching (2008): “Skills, innovation and growth: an agent-based policy
analysis,” Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie und Statistik/Journal of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 228, 251–275.
Dawid, H., S. Gemkow, P. Harting, S. van der Hoog, and M. Neu-
gart (2011b): “The Eurace@Unibi Model: An Agent-Based Macroeco-
nomic Model for Economic Policy Analysis,” Working Paper, Bielefeld
University.
Dawid, H. and P. Harting (2012): “Capturing Firm Behavior in Agent-
Based Models of Industry Evolution and Macroeconomic Dynamics,” in
Applied Evolutionary Economics, Behavior and Organizations, ed. by
G. Bu¨nsdorf, Edward-Elgar, 103–130.
Delli Gatti, D., C. Guilmi, E. Gaffeo, G. Giulioni, M. Gallegati,
and A. Palestrini (2005): “A new approach to business fluctuations:
heterogenous interacting agents, scaling laws, and financial fragility,” Jour-
nal of Economics and Organization, 56, 489–512.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini (2010): “Schumpeter meet-
ing Keynes: A policy-friendly model of endogenous growth and business
cycles,” Journal of Economics and Control, 34, 1748–1767.
Dunne, T., L. Foster, J. Haltiwanger, and K. R. Troske (2004):
“Wage and Productivity Dispersion in United States Manufacturing: The
Role of Computer Investment,” Journal of Labor Economics, 22, 397–430.
Dustmann, C., A. Glitz, and U. Scho¨nberg (2010): “Referral-based
Job Search Networks,” Mimeo, University College London.
Faggio, G., K. Salvanes, and J. van Reenen (2010): “The Evolution
of Inequality in Productivity and Wages: Panel Data Evidence,” Industrial
and Corporate Change, 19, 19191–951.
31
Gemkow, S. (2011): “Three Essays on Individual Decisions and Interac-
tions on the Labor Market and Aggregated Inequality: An Agent-based
Approach,” Doctoral Dissertation, Bielefeld University.
Gemkow, S. and M. Neugart (2011): “Referral Hiring, Endogenous
Social Networks, and Inequality: An Agent-Based Analysis,” Journal of
Evolutionary Economics, forthcoming.
Goel, D. and K. Lang (2009): “Social Ties and the Job Search of Recent
Immigrants,” NBER Working Paper 15186.
Goos, M., A. Manning, and A. Salomons (2009): “Job Polarization in
Europe,” The American Economic Review, 58–63, papers and Proceedings
of the One Hundred Twenty-First Meeting of the American Economic.
Griffith, R., S. Redding, and J. van Reeren (2004): “Mapping the
two faces of R&D: Productivity growth in a panel of OECD industries,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 7, 411–436.
Ioannides, Y. and L. Loury (2004): “Job information networks, neigh-
borhood effects, and inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 42, 1056–
1093.
Lemieux, T. (2006): “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition
Effects, Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?” The American Economic
Review, 461–498.
Lewis, K., J. Kaufmann, M. Gonzales, M. Wimmer, and N. Chris-
takis (2008): “Tastes,ties, and time: A new social network dataset using
Facebook.com,” Social Networks, 30, 330–342.
Malhotra, N. (1984): “The Use of Linear Logit Models in Marketing
Research,” Journal of Marketing research, 11, 20–31.
Marmaros, D. and B. Sacerdote (2002): “Peer and Social Networks in
Job Search,” European Economic Review, 46, 870–879.
Montgomery, J. (1991): “Social networks and labor-market outcomes:
toward an economic analysis,” American Economic Review, 81, 1408–1418.
Newman, M. E. J. (2010): Networks: An Introduction, Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Pellizzari, M. (2010): “Do friends and relatives really help in getting a
good job,” Industrial and Labor Review, 63, 494–510.
32
Pingle, M. and L. Tesfatsion (2003): “Evolution of worker-employer
networks and behaviors under alternative unemployment benefits: an
agent-based computational study,” in Innovations in Economic and Fi-
nancial Networks, ed. by A. Nagurney, Edward Elgar Publishers, 256–285.
Pistaferri, L. (1999): “Informal Networks in the Italian Labor Market,”
Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 58, 355–375.
Saloner, G. (1985): “Old Boy Networks as Screening Mechanism,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 3, 255–267.
Schmutte, I. (2010): “Job referral networks and the determination of earn-
ings in local labor markets,” Cornell University Department of Economics.
Simon, C. and J. Warner (1992): “Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect
of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings and Tenure,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 10, 306–330.
Tassier, T. and F. Menczer (2001): “Emering small world referral net-
works in evolutionary labor markets,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary
Computation, 5, 482–492.
Tesfatsion, L. and K. E. Judd (2006): Handbook of Computational Eco-
nomics II: Agent-Based Computational Economics, North-Holland.
Violante, G. (2002): “Technological Acceleration, Skill Transferability,
and the Rise in Residual Inequality,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
297–338.
33
